Knight-Ridder continues to focus on the negative (headline includes "U.S. blunders"), but offers more interesting analysis of Iraqi tactics; it's worth reading as a good summary. Again, determination to stay the course is key, and victory is the only worthy goal.
While American military planners have concentrated since the Persian Gulf War on making more and better use of high technology, their Iraqi counterparts appear to have been taking lessons from every battle the United States, Great Britain and Israel have either lost or failed to win.
If there's a central organizing principle to the Iraqi strategy, it appears to have been drawn from Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia: If you can inflict enough American casualties and make enough Americans think they've lost the moral high ground, you can lose the battles but win the war.
Finally, like the Yugoslavs, the Iraqis seem to be trying to preserve their best forces, the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard, for last by moving and concealing them. Despite three months of NATO air attacks, the Yugoslavs managed to protect more than 90 percent of their army.
The author does write an honest conclusion:
It isn't clear, however, whether the Iraqis read all the way to the end of the Yugoslav textbook. The Yugoslavs lost, and many of their leaders are now on trial, accused of war crimes.
Posted by Alan at March 30, 2003 04:43 PM