Mansoor Ijaz has a new take on the reasons we were unsuccessful in getting a deal with Turkey, and what should be done to rebuild our relationship with this critical ally. As usual, he is talking about issues that others simply don't address.
That Turkey's military was willing to withstand such overwhelming financial pressures by withholding critical support for the U.S. proposal is less a function of fears that a postwar Kurdistan could be born in northern Iraq, engendering similar separatist tendencies in southern Turkey, than it is of deep misgivings about the ongoing role 70,000 American troops would have played in the region.
Turkish military calculations about the troops’ strength needed to combat a dilapidated Iraqi army that even the Turks knew they could defeat didn't square with the magnitude of troop deployments and technological capabilities the U.S. had proposed to base in southern Turkey. Translation: The Turks believed Washington had already set its sights on Tehran, and possibly Damascus, for post-Iraq military operations and was casing the battlefield for those theaters.
Turkey remains the political model for the Islamic world to emulate. Its economic ruin is not an option Washington can pursue to cow Ankara down. The Bush administration needs to hold Ankara's hand while its new government learns the ropes and decides who its friends are. That is what real allies do in times of war, and the U.S. must shoulder this responsibility.
Posted by Alan at March 30, 2003 07:30 AM