Ralph Peters has a general idea of what's been going on inside the intelligence apparatus.
Few human beings argue with conclusions they want to believe. When the U.S. intelligence community insisted that Saddam's regime possessed hidden weapons of mass destruction, President Bush and his advisers welcomed the "evidence."Bush believed correctly that Saddam needed to go. And the supportive analysis provided by U.S. intelligence was seconded by the British. Even the French and German intel organizations believed Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. Remember that the pre-war argument was not about Saddam's capabilities. It was about the best means to de-fang him.
What went wrong?
Three factors led our intelligence apparatus down the garden path: decades of overreliance on technology; a corresponding neglect of the human factor, and group-think.
Intel professionals — many of whom are far better than their sullied reputation — will respond that there was a great deal of internal debate on the issue of Iraq's WMDs. But it's the terms of the debate that matter: Once the system concluded, as it had done over a decade before, that Saddam had WMDs and wanted more, the internal discussions declined a fatal notch. It was no longer a matter of if, but of how much and where.
"Serious" questions could only be asked within the accepted paradigm. We had only the illusion of a debate.
Certainly, the evidence of WMDs was plentiful: Saddam had used chemical weapons in the past; inspections after Desert Storm found a vigorous WMD program, which the United Nations demanded must be dismantled; and Saddam, suicidally foolish, played cat-and-mouse games to the end — even though his stockpiles were gone.
Now we learn that even Saddam didn't have a grip on the situation — lied to by his subordinates, he, too, believed he had more advanced programs than actually existed. All the while, craven Iraqi exiles told us what they knew we wanted to hear.
It would have taken brilliant "out of the box" analysis to get it right. But our intelligence system is, above all, a bureaucracy. And bureaucracies cherish consistency, while shunning the risks of excellence. Bureaucracies only deliver what executives demand. Left to their own devices, they plod along in a defensive crouch.
Administrations come and go. If we truly want to improve our intelligence system, only sustained, bipartisan congressional action can force the critical changes. We all know that members of Congress have a genius for criticism. But can they summon the will to fix a system that their own neglect and rhetoric has crippled?
Via the New York Post
Posted by Alan at January 31, 2004 11:20 AM