Lots of revisionist Iraq War history in the news this weekend.
New York Times reporter Michael Gordon and retired Marine general Bernard Trainor have a new book, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. They report that the U.S. military misjudged the nature of the Iraqi resistance to the invasion.
The unexpected tenacity of the Fedayeen in the battles for Nasiriya, Samawa, Najaf and other towns on the road to Baghdad was an early indication that the adversary was not merely Saddam Hussein's vaunted Republican Guard.The paramilitary Fedayeen were numerous, well-armed, dispersed throughout the country, and seemingly determined to fight to the death. But while many officers in the field assessed the Fedayeen as a dogged foe, Franks and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld saw them as little more than a speed bump on the way to Baghdad.
Three years later, Iraq has yet to be subdued. While the outcome of the drive to Baghdad is clear, how some of the key decisions in the war were made and some significant episodes are largely unknown.
Among them: A U.S. Marine Corps intelligence officer warned after the bloody battle at Nasiriya, the first major fight of the war, that the Fedayeen would continue to mount attacks after the fall of Baghdad since many of the enemy fighters were being bypassed in the race to the capital.
Gordon also reports on the decisions and movements of Saddam Hussein as the war began to unfold.
Ever vigilant about coups and fearful of revolt, Hussein was deeply distrustful of his own commanders and soldiers, the documents show. He made crucial decisions himself, relied on his sons for military counsel and imposed security measures that had the effect of hobbling his forces. He did that in several ways:The Iraqi dictator was so secretive and kept information so compartmentalized that his top military leaders were stunned when he told them three months before the war that he had no weapons of mass destruction, and they were demoralized because they had counted on hidden stocks of poison gas or germ weapons for the nation's defense.
He put a general widely viewed as an incompetent drunkard in charge of the Special Republican Guard, entrusted to protect the capital, primarily because he was considered loyal.
Hussein micromanaged the war, not allowing commanders to move troops without permission from Baghdad and blocking communications among military leaders. The Fedayeen's operations were not shared with leaders of conventional forces.
Republican Guard divisions were not allowed to communicate with sister units.
Commanders could not even get precise maps of terrain near the Baghdad airport because that would identify locations of the Iraqi leader's palaces.
Gordon and Trainor were on Meet the Press today. It was interesting to see that Tim Russert was focused only on the flaws in war-planning decisions (or, more precisely, the reported flaws -- no actual war planners were represented), and not at all on what Saddam Hussein himself was doing. Also interesting: there was no discussion at all on the role of foreign terrorists.
Gordon and Trainor were notably vague on what should have been done differently and what should be done now. It's always harder to make the command decisions than it is to critique the decisions after the fact.
History is revealing, but there's a bottom-line issue now: what actions to take to create a real success, even if the nature of the success is not what we originally wanted. This war was always a gambit to achieve a victory and then leverage that victory to our strategic advantage with the Islamist dictators of the Middle East. Not achieving a dramatic and obvious victory imperils us all, because it emboldens the dictators. What can we salvage?
Posted by Alan at March 12, 2006 12:41 PM