Petrified Truth

Music education

Here's one for the home team: Katy ISD named as one of "Best 100 Communities for Music Education in America."

The 2006 roster includes school districts from 31 states whose commitment to quality music education—measured across a variety of economic, curricular and programmatic criteria—has enabled them to stand out despite the many pressures on music and arts programs across the country....

"All of the communities who participated in the survey should be applauded for making sure music education is part of a quality education for all children," said Mary Luehrsen, Director of Public Affairs and Government Relations for NAMM. "With testing and accountability requirements, schools are facing many challenges in maintaining curricular time and resources that assure students have access to music education. The schools who participated in the survey and are being recognized here, consider music education integral to a quality education—not optional, elective, or available only if time permits."

Luehrsen also noted that as scientific research continues to bring to light the social, academic and developmental benefits of an education that includes music, communities are placing increased value on music education programs in their districts. "The survey helps to highlight the importance of music education, but it's those communities on the list that truly set the standard. They provide solid role models for community support of music education."

Our kids have eagerly participated in band and choir -- it's been essential. Of course, there are those know-nothings who say it's just a frill, but they are (so far) a minority in our community.

See the full Top 100 list.

Waiting Bush out

Amir Taheri makes some important observations about the "waiting" strategy being played out by America's implacable foes in the Middle East. Their assumption: President Bush is an aberration in U.S. politics, and his successor will be considerably less decisive.

It is not only in Tehran and Damascus that the game of "waiting Bush out" is played with determination. In recent visits to several regional capitals, this writer was struck by the popularity of this new game from Islamabad to Rabat. The general assumption is that Mr. Bush's plan to help democratize the heartland of Islam is fading under an avalanche of partisan attacks inside the U.S. The effect of this assumption can be witnessed everywhere.

Taheri remains optimistic that America will not falter after Bush. I'm not so sure, and that's why the lack so far of a clear-cut victory in Iraq may be so high. Who else will step up to lead?

Read the whole thing.

Chaz Crawford, RIP

Here's tough news: a recent casualty in Iraq had a local connection.

During a hiking trip last year, Chaz Crawford told his father that he didn't feel he had finished the job he set out to do serving his country in the ongoing war on terror in the Middle East.

After two tours of duty in Afghanistan as a member of the elite U.S. Army Airborne Rangers, Crawford had left the military and enrolled at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette as a chemical engineering major. But student life didn't suit him, and he felt a pull to return to the war zone.

Chaz Benjamin Crawford, 23, was killed in northern Iraq on March 14, when a suicide bomber attacked the vehicle he was in while he was working for a private security company hired by the U.S. Department of Defense.

"We supported him," father Geoff Crawford said this week. "We support the action over there. It's not that difficult for us to see that he did it for a worthy cause."

Just two days before he died, Crawford, who graduated from Taylor High School in Katy in 2000, sent an e-mail to his family, proudly telling them he had been promoted to team leader.

The young man was among the first troops deployed to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom the month after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Last year, Crawford went to Iraq to work as a private security guard for Aegis Defence Services, protecting top U.S. military officers and diplomats.

Related:

• Katy Times - Obituary: Crawford Served in Middle East

Back from the brink of lunacy

Here's good news: the Judson ISD school board is smarter than its know-nothing district superintendent.

A suburban San Antonio school board has reversed the superintendent's ban of a critically acclaimed science fiction novel.

By a 5-2 vote, the Judson school district board Thursday overruled Superintendent Ed Lyman's ban of the novel The Handmaid's Tale from an advanced placement English curriculum.

The vote came after nearly three hours of public comment, including that of Judson High School students.

The Judson board is also smarter than the dunderheads in California who've banned Clifford the Big Red Dog.

Know-Nothing alert

Here's another know-nothing Texas school superintendent at work.

The Judson Independent School District superintendent has pulled a critically acclaimed novel after a parent complained that it was sexually explicit and offensive to Christians.

Ed Lyman pulled The Handmaid's Tale by Canadian novelist Margaret Atwood from the district's Advanced Placement English curriculum because he said he found some of the descriptions in the book too sexually explicit for high school students.

Lyman overruled the recommendation of a committee of teachers, students and a parent in agreeing to remove the book. The committee is appealing the decision to the school board. A meeting is scheduled Thursday night.

District policy allows parents who object to reading material to request their children be given an alternative assignment.

Note how the Super refused to follow his district's own review process when the committee didn't reach the conclusion he preferred. Once again, a whining parent has been allowed to dictate how other parents' children are, and are not, educated.

• Judson ISD - "Where Bright Futures are Built"

Iraq as the new Finland?

George Friedman of Austin-based Stratfor thinks he understands the back-and-forth between Iran and the U.S. He also presents a case that Iran helped tee up the invasion of Iraq.

Iran responded to the 9/11 attacks in a predictable manner. First, Iran was as concerned by al Qaeda as the United States was. The Iranians saw themselves as the vanguard of revolutionary Islam, and they did not want to see their place usurped by Wahhabis, whom they viewed as the tool of another regional rival, Saudi Arabia. Thus, Tehran immediately offered U.S. forces the right to land, at Iranian airbases, aircraft that were damaged during operations in Afghanistan. Far more important, the Iranians used their substantial influence in western and northern Afghanistan to secure allies for the United States. They wanted the Taliban gone. This is not to say that some al Qaeda operatives, having paid or otherwise induced regional Iranian commanders, didn't receive some sanctuary in Iran; the Iranians would have given sanctuary to Osama bin Laden if that would have neutralized him. But Tehran's policy was to oppose al Qaeda and the Taliban, and to quietly support the United States in its war against them. This was no stranger, really, than the Americans giving anti-tank missiles to Khomeini in the 1980s.

But the main chance that Iran saw was getting the Americans to invade Iraq and depose their true enemy, Saddam Hussein. The United States was not led to invade Iraq by the Iranians -- that would be too simple a model. However, the Iranians, with their excellent intelligence network in Iraq, helped to smooth the way for the American decision. Apart from providing useful tactical information, the Iranians led the Americans to believe three things:

1. That Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction programs.

2. That the Iraqis would not resist U.S. operations and would greet the Americans as liberators.

3. By omission, that there would be no post-war resistance in Iraq.

Again, this was not decisive, but it formed an important part of the analytical framework through which the Americans viewed Iraq.

The Iranians wanted the United States to defeat Hussein. They wanted the United States to bear the burden of pacifying the Sunni regions of Iraq. They wanted U.S. forces to bog down in Iraq so that, in due course, the Americans would withdraw -- but only after the Sunnis were broken -- leaving behind a Shiite government that would be heavily influenced by Iran. The Iranians did everything they could to encourage the initial engagement and then stood by as the United States fought the Sunnis. They were getting what they wanted.

What they did not count on was American flexibility....

FULL ARTICLE

Putting Cards on the Table in Iraq
By George Friedman

The clouds couldn't have been darker last week. Everyone was talking about civil war in Iraq. Smart and informed people were talking about the real possibility of an American airstrike against Iran's nuclear capabilities. The Iranians were hurling defiance in every direction on the compass. U.S. President George W. Bush seemed to be politically on the ropes, unable to control his own party. And then seemingly out of nowhere, the Iranians offered to hold talks with the Americans on Iraq, and only Iraq. With the kind of lightning speed not seen from the White House for a while, the United States accepted. Suddenly, the two countries with the greatest stake in Iraq -- and the deepest hostility toward each other -- had agreed publicly to negotiate on Iraq.

To understand this development, we must understand that Iran and the United States have been holding quiet, secret, back-channel and off-the-record discussions for years -- but the discussions were no less important for all of that. The Iran-Contra affair, for example, could not have taken place had the Reagan administration not been talking to the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini's representatives. There is nothing new about Americans and Iranians talking; they have been doing it for years. Each side, for their own domestic reasons, has tried to hide the talks from public view, even when they were quite public, such as the Geneva discussions over Afghanistan prior to the Sept. 11 attacks.

What is dramatically new is the public nature of these talks now, and the subject matter: Iraq.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but the real players in Iraq are now going to sit down and see if they can reach some decisions about the country's future. They are going to do this over the heads of their various clients. Obviously, the needs of those clients will have to be satisfied, but in the end, the Iraq war is at least partly about U.S.-Iranian relations, and it is clear that both sides have now decided that it is time to explore a deal -- not in a quiet Georgetown restaurant, but in full view of the world. In other words, it is time to get serious.

The offer of public talks actually was not made by Iran. The first public proposal for talks came from U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, who several months ago reported that he had been authorized by Bush to open two lines of discussion: One was with the non-jihadist Sunni leadership in Iraq; the other was with Iran. Interestingly, Khalilzad had emphasized that he was authorized to speak with the Iranians only about Iraq and not about other subjects. In other words, discussion of Iran's nuclear program was not going to take place. What happened last week was that the Iranians finally gave Khalilzad an answer: yes.

Iran's Slow Play

As we have discussed many times, Iraq has been Iran's obsession. It is an obsession rooted in ancient history; the Bible speaks of the struggle between Babylon and Persia for regional hegemony. It has some of its roots in more recent history as well: Iran lost about 300,000 people, with about 1 million more wounded and captured, in its 1980-88 war with Iraq. That would be the equivalent of more than 1 million dead Americans and an additional 4 million wounded and captured. It is a staggering number. Nothing can be understood about Iran until the impact of this war is understood. The Iranians, then, came out of the war with two things: an utter hatred of Saddam Hussein and his regime, and determination that this sort of devastation should never happen again.

After the United States decided, in Desert Storm, not to move on to Baghdad and overthrow the Hussein regime -- and after the catastrophic failure of the Shiite rising in southern Iraq -- the Iranians established a program of covert operations that was designed to increase their control of the Shiite population in the south. The Iranians were unable to wage war against Hussein but were content, after Desert Storm, that he could not attack Iran. So they focused on increasing their influence in the south and bided their time. They could not take out Hussein, but they still wanted someone to do so. That someone was the Americans.

Iran responded to the 9/11 attacks in a predictable manner. First, Iran was as concerned by al Qaeda as the United States was. The Iranians saw themselves as the vanguard of revolutionary Islam, and they did not want to see their place usurped by Wahhabis, whom they viewed as the tool of another regional rival, Saudi Arabia. Thus, Tehran immediately offered U.S. forces the right to land, at Iranian airbases, aircraft that were damaged during operations in Afghanistan. Far more important, the Iranians used their substantial influence in western and northern Afghanistan to secure allies for the United States. They wanted the Taliban gone. This is not to say that some al Qaeda operatives, having paid or otherwise induced regional Iranian commanders, didn't receive some sanctuary in Iran; the Iranians would have given sanctuary to Osama bin Laden if that would have neutralized him. But Tehran's policy was to oppose al Qaeda and the Taliban, and to quietly support the United States in its war against them. This was no stranger, really, than the Americans giving anti-tank missiles to Khomeini in the 1980s.

But the main chance that Iran saw was getting the Americans to invade Iraq and depose their true enemy, Saddam Hussein. The United States was not led to invade Iraq by the Iranians -- that would be too simple a model. However, the Iranians, with their excellent intelligence network in Iraq, helped to smooth the way for the American decision. Apart from providing useful tactical information, the Iranians led the Americans to believe three things:

1. That Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction programs.

2. That the Iraqis would not resist U.S. operations and would greet the Americans as liberators.

3. By omission, that there would be no post-war resistance in Iraq.

Again, this was not decisive, but it formed an important part of the analytical framework through which the Americans viewed Iraq.

The Iranians wanted the United States to defeat Hussein. They wanted the United States to bear the burden of pacifying the Sunni regions of Iraq. They wanted U.S. forces to bog down in Iraq so that, in due course, the Americans would withdraw -- but only after the Sunnis were broken -- leaving behind a Shiite government that would be heavily influenced by Iran. The Iranians did everything they could to encourage the initial engagement and then stood by as the United States fought the Sunnis. They were getting what they wanted.

Counterplays and Timing

What they did not count on was American flexibility. From the first battle of Al Fallujah onward, the United States engaged in negotiations with the Sunni leadership. The United States had two goals: one, to use the Sunni presence in a new Iraqi government to block Iranian ambitions; and two, to split the Sunnis from the jihadists. It was the very success of this strategy, evident in the December 2005 elections, that caused Iraqi Shia to move away from the Iranians a bit, and, more important, caused the jihadists to launch an anti-Shiite rampage. The jihadists' goal was to force a civil war in Iraq and drive the Sunnis back into an unbreakable alliance with them.

In other words, the war was not going in favor of either the United States or Iran. The Americans were bogged down in a war that could not be won with available manpower, if by "victory" we mean breaking the Sunni-jihadist will to resist. The Iranians envisioned the re-emergence of their former Baathist enemies. Not altogether certain of the political commitments or even the political savvy of their Shiite allies in Iraq, they could now picture their worst nightmare: a coalition government in which the Sunnis, maneuvering with the Kurds and Americans, would dominate an Iraqi government. They saw Tehran's own years of maneuvering as being in jeopardy. Neither side could any longer be certain of the outcome.

In response, each side attempted, first, to rattle the other. Iran's nuclear maneuver was designed to render the Americans more forthcoming; the assumption was that a nuclear Iran would be more frightening, from the American point of view, than a Shiite Iraq. The Americans held off responding and then, a few weeks ago, began letting it be known that not only were airstrikes against Iran possible, but that in fact they were being seriously considered and that deadlines were being drawn up.

This wasn't about nuclear weapons but about Iraq, as both sides made clear when the talks were announced. Both players now have all their cards on the table. Iran bluffed nukes, the United States called the bluff and seemed about to raise. Khalilzad's request for talks was still on the table. The Iranians took it. This was not really done in order to forestall airstrikes -- the Iranians were worried about that only on the margins. What Iran had was a deep concern and an interesting opportunity.

The concern was that the situation in Iraq was spinning out of its control. The United States was no longer predictable, the Sunnis were no longer predictable, and even the Iranians' Shiite allies were not playing their proper role. The Iranians were playing for huge stakes in Iraq and there were suddenly too many moving pieces, too many things that could go wrong.

The Iranians also saw an opportunity. Bush's political position in the United States had deteriorated dramatically. As it deteriorated, his room for maneuver declined. The British had made it clear that they were planning to leave Iraq. Bush had really not been isolated before, as his critics always charged, but now he was
becoming isolated -- domestically as well as internationally. Bush needed badly to break out of the political bind he was in. The administration had resisted pressure to withdraw troops under a timetable, but it no longer was clear whether Congress would permit Bush to continue to resist. The president did not want his hands tied by Congress, but it seemed to the Iranians that was exactly what was happening.

From the Iranian point of view, if ever a man has needed a deal, it is Bush. If there are going to be any negotiations, they are to happen now. From Bush's point of view, he does need a deal, but so do the Iranians -- things are ratcheting out of control from Tehran's point of view as well. For domestic Iraqi players, the room to maneuver is increasing, while the room to maneuver for foreign players is decreasing. In other words, the United States and Iran have, for the moment, the unified interest of managing Iraq, rather than seeing a civil war or a purely domestic solution.

The Next Phase of the Game

The Iranians want at least to Finlandize Iraq. During the Cold War, the Soviets did not turn Finland into a satellite, but they did have the right to veto members of its government, to influence the size and composition of its military and to require a neutral foreign policy. The Iranians wanted more, but they will settle for keeping the worst of the Baathists out of the government and for controls over Iraq's international behavior. The Americans want a coalition government within the limits of a Finlandic solution. They do not want a purely Shiite government; they want the Sunnis to deal with the jihadists, in return for guaranteed Sunni rights in Iraq. Finally, the United States wants the right to place a force in Iraq -- aircraft and perhaps 40,000 troops -- outside the urban areas, in the west. The Iranians do not really want U.S. troops so close, so they will probably argue about the number and the type. They do not want to see heavy armored units but can live with lighter units stationed to the west.

Now obviously, in this negotiation, each side will express distrust and indifference. The White House won the raise by expressing doubts as to Tehran's seriousness; the implication was that the Iranians were buying time to work on their nukes. Perhaps. But the fact is that Tehran will work on nukes as and when it wants, and Washington will destroy the nukes as and when it wants. The nukes are non-issues in the real negotiations.

There are three problems now with negotiations. One is Bush's ability to keep his coalition intact while he negotiates with a member of the "axis of evil." Another is Iran's ability to keep its coalition together while it negotiates with the "Great Satan." And third is the ability of either to impose their collective will on an increasingly self-reliant Iraqi polity. The two major powers are now ready to talk. What is not clear is whether, even together, they will be in a position to impose their will on the Iraqis. The coalitions will probably hold, and the Iraqis will probably submit. But those are three "probablies." Not good.

All wars end in negotiations. Clearly, the United States and Iran have been talking quietly for a long time. They now have decided it is time to make their talks public. That decision by itself indicates how seriously they both take these conversations now.

This report may be distributed or republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com .

© Copyright 2006 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.

Data mining

Interesting: the intelligence community has discovered (again) that public information can be a rich source of valuable knowledge, and has established an Open Source Center to collect and analyze it.

The data can be free—such as local property records, voter registrations and political-campaign contributions—or it can be for sale, such as credit reports, commercial satellite imagery and New York Times articles. The data might already be in database format, or it may have to be converted, as are transcripts of TV and radio broadcasts. All of it, however, is grist for the mills of analysts throughout the intelligence community. The center is the clearinghouse for much of it.

“We like to make a distinction between collection and acquisition,” said [Eliot Jardines, assistant deputy director in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)]. Traditionally, the IC has owned the means of collection, with an emphasis on covert intelligence gathering. But open-source intelligence revolves around acquiring information that someone else has collected, organized and published, he said.

...

The OSC monitors somewhere between 150 and 300 jihadist Web sites it considers the most significant.... The center also tracks about 500 television stations, with access to about 20,000 around the globe. Throw in blogs, radio broadcasts, even bumper stickers and graffiti (they reflect local public sentiment “on the ground”), and one can see just how vast a sea of data is covered by open-source data mining.

Of course, librarians have known this for decades.

Panic in Washington, D.C.

It's an election year, so here goes Congress, demonstrating its stupidity again. And look who's leading the way: frightened Republicans, led by the always dull-witted Arlen Specter.

Senior executives from major oil companies underwent a grilling yesterday at a Senate hearing, where lawmakers from both parties blamed mergers for boosting energy prices and threatened to press ahead with legislation aimed at stiffening the antitrust rules governing the industry.

The hearing at the Senate Judiciary Committee marked an escalation in Congress's efforts to show that it is cracking down on the oil giants as the industry is reaping record profits and voters remain angry about high prices for gasoline and natural gas. In a symbol of senatorial high dudgeon, the six executives appearing before the panel were sworn in, something they did not have to undergo when they were hauled before another Senate panel in November.

Spearheading the attack on the industry was the committee's chairman, Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), who called the hearing to examine evidence that the spate of mergers among major firms in recent years was leading to price gouging and other collusive behavior. He said there was a strong correlation between soaring fuel costs and "a phenomenal rise in the concentration of oil and gas companies" and warned the executives that bipartisan support was building for an antitrust bill he has drafted. The bill would make it illegal to withhold fuel from the market in an attempt to lift prices, and it would also impose new limits on oil mergers.

This perenniel, onerous exercise in legislative vacuity is groundless, documented as recently as a 2004 study by the Federal Trade Commission that concluded, after an exhaustive review:

"Mergers of private oil companies have not significantly effected worldwide concentration in crude oil. This fact is important, because crude oil prices are the chief determinant of gasoline prices."

State-owned companies control the market now, period.

Posted by Alan at 05:39 AM